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RESPONSE 
Reviewer: Constantin Negoita, City University of New York 
Paul R. Cohen, Heuristic Reasoning about Uncertainty: An Artificial 
Intelligence Approach, Pitman, Boston and London, 1985. 
Negoita's review represents some aspects of my book quite well but misstates a 
few points and ignores ome others. Since the book was published, my purported 
antipathy for numbers has been the object of contention so often that I nearly 
began to believe the strident claims people were making on my behalf. Negoita's 
representation f my position is sober by comparison: "Cohen's tated purpose 
is to argue openly against numerical knowledge representation schemes that are 
currently in vogue in approximate reasoning." This is not the whole picture. 
Why do we argue for or against particular knowledge representations in 
artificial intelligence? Why would one criticize numbers when they have served 
science for centuries? I said: 
We need a new representation to distinguish between situations that were 
indistinguishable before--to distinguish utility from probability, to 
distinguish the effects of salience from corrections for those effects, to 
distinguish skepticism about an inference rule from the quality of data 
used in that rule, to distinguish reasons for believing from reasons for 
disbelieving, and so on. (p. 36) 
I do not object to numerical representations if they have clear semantics, but 
ambiguity is intolerable. AI needs explicit, unambiguous knowledge represen- 
tations. This is an important and completely uncontroversial principle of 
knowledge ngineering [1]. Thus, after several pages of criticisms of implicit 
numerical schemes, I wrote: 
The model of endorsement does not preclude • • • numerical measures. 
My goal has been to see how far one can go [exclusively] with qualitative 
reasons for believing and disbelieving. By doing this we engage in an 
experiment. (p. 53) 
So this is the first important point that was missed in Negoita's review: My book 
presents an experiment in knowledge representation. 
As with any experiment, the work offers some results but raises more 
questions. Here are some results: It is extremely difficult to reason about 
uncertain propositions without degrees of belief. I tried it in the SOLOMON 
system, and my students tried again in the domains of plan recognition [2] and 
long-range business planning [3], but these results suggest hat a great deal of 
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domain knowledge is required in lieu of numbers. It is immaterial to me whether 
degree of belief is represented as probabilities, fuzzy numbers, or linguistic 
variables--some such representation is necessary. But these are generally not 
sufficient for explanation, knowledge acquisition, or control in knowledge 
systems. Qualitative representations of uncertainty are more appropriate for 
these tasks. In particular, they allow a problem solver to decide what to do when 
it is uncertain. This is the most important result of the work because it redefines 
the role that uncertainty has previously played in AI systems: uncertainty should 
not be "tacked on" to logical inferences in deductive systems; rather, it should 
be treated as a defining aspect of many problems and managed by appropriate 
problem-solving strategies and tactics. If representations of uncertainty are rich 
enough to help the problem solver decide how to proceed, then uncertainty can 
actually facilitate problem solving by helping to select problem-solving 
methods. This position was implicit in the control approaches discussed in 
section 2.2.7 of my book, and is the theme of a recent paper in this journal [4]. 
One problem that was not solved in the book concerns the integration of 
numeric and qualitative representations of uncertainty. Both are needed, one to 
represent degree of belief and the other to represent the reasons for belief. 
Clearly, if the reasons are weak then the numbers hould be small, and if the 
reasons are strong the numbers hould be large. When several such numbers are 
combined, how can we be sure that the resulting number will accurately 
summarize the combination of the several reasons? This problem is currently 
unsolved. It can be viewed from two perspectives: asa fatal flaw in my approach 
or as a prerequisite for integrating numeric approaches to uncertainty with AI 
problem-solving techniques. Even the staunchest advocate of numerical ap- 
proaches must agree that combinations of numeric degrees of belief should 
accurately represent he corresponding combined arguments pro and con 
hypotheses. Therefore, if it is difficult to ensure the consistency of the two 
representations i  a single AI system, then perhaps the exclusively numerical 
methods are fatally flawed. 
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